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BOOK REVIEW
A Precarious Path: The Bill of Rights
After 200 Years
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFTER 200 YEARS. By
David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, eds. Indiana University
Press, 1993. Pp. vii, 246, index. [Cloth, $29.95; Paper, $12.95.]
Reviewed by Tony A. Freyer*
The Bill of Rights occupies an ambiguous place in American
society. Americans favor the Bill of Rights in principle, but when
asked whether they support particular rights guarantees for real-life
practices such as gun ownership, capital punishment, abortion, and
flag burning, Americans fervently and profoundly disagree. The
essays David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr. have compiled in
The Bill of Rights in Modern America After 200 Years, richly suggest
why Americans have reconciled principle and practice with such
difficulty.2 Written for a popular audience by specialists who possess a
profound knowledge of and differing views concerning the technical
and philosophical issues, these essays clearly achieve the editors' goal
of promoting "a fresh and lively dialogue that probes contemporary
controversies over the scope and protection of individual rights."3
Central to this dialogue is the fundamental tension between
individual and community rights claims. Americans disagree about
the practical application of rights guarantees largely because those
* University Research Professor of History and Law, University of Alabama. A.B., San
Diego State University; M.A., Ph.D., Indiana University. The Author wishes to thank Robert
B.W. McLaughlin, J.D., Alabama, 1996, for research assistance.
1. David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., eds., The Bill of Rights in Modern America
After 200 Years (Indiana U., 1993) (hereinafter "Bodenhamer and Ely").
2. Throughout this Review, when the source is the text of the book, the Review will refer
to the essay in which the reference occurs, giving the name of the essay's author or authors.
Other sources are cited by standard citation form.
3. Bodenhamer and Ely at viii (cited in note 1).
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guarantees acquire meaningful content principally within the context
of community expectations and authority. As abstract principles,
rights exist in a vacuum. When it comes to the exercise of rights,
however, the vacuum is filled with various social interests that attach
to sometimes competing claims to these rights. Settlement of these
conflicting rights claims requires government intervention. At least in
constitutional democracies such as the United States, this interven-
tion creates a public space within which individual, group, and local
and national communitarian4 conflicts are resolved. In practice, gov-
ernment intervention often restricts individual and group rights, yet it
also permits majoritarian institutions to formally sanction and even
broaden rights claims. Thus, the community's power to curb or de-
stroy rights coexists with its authority to sanction and expand rights.5
Conflicting rights claims also create struggles to secure legiti-
mation from constitutional institutions and authorities. The power of
courts, legislatures, and law enforcement agencies to resolve conflicts
involving individual and community interests and to administer ap-
propriate remedies rests on an official interpretation of constitutional
provisions. This interpretation determines the legitimacy of the
actions of not only individual and communitarian interests but also
governmental bodies and officials charged with implementing consti-
tutional provisions. Bodenhamer and Ely's collection of essays ad-
dresses the legitimation issue in a variety of contexts. This issue
appears in perhaps its most familiar form when essay authors explain
and evaluate particular doctrines established by the Supreme Court
that pertain to such matters as the rights of the accused, the death
4. My use of "communitarian" may need clarification. Certain dictionaries employ a defi-
nition involving a communal system of organization based on small cooperative communities,
which may or may not involve communist principles. In current "rights" literature, the term
retains the communal-collectivist-cooperative dimensions pertaining to group as opposed to
strictly individualistic values. My use of the term draws upon an older republican tradition that
has been the subject of substantial historical literature, summarized in Forrest McDonald, Novus
Ordo Seclorum, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Kansas U., 1985). The republican
meaning of "communitarian" may be defined, to use McDonald's words, as 'rights reserved to the
public in its capacity as an aggregate of private individuals rather than in its corporate capacity.'
Id. at 29. For example, the right to a jury trial, the right of assembly, the right to express values
favoring community as opposed to individual action, the right to free exercise of religion (when
this involves a religious group rather than a lone believer), the right to organize for political
purposes, or even the right to vote as it includes groups that may or may not constitute a majority
faction are "communitarian" in the sense the term is used in the following pages.
5. Daniel T. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness in American History, in Bodenhamer and Ely
at 3-17 (cited in note 1). For a discussion of the concepts of "vacuum" and "space" applied in an
economic regulatory context, see Clifford D. Shearing, A Constitutive Conception of Regulation, in
Peter Grobosky and John Braithwaite, eds., Business Regulation in Australia's Future 67-87
(Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, ACT, 1993).
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penalty, symbolic speech, and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Here, the
issue involves not simply whether the Court's doctrines, for policy
reasons, should legitimate either an expansion or a contraction of
rights claims. The larger implication is whether elected and other
non-judicial state or federal officials more appropriately should
determine the legitimacy of rights claims. This point also bears upon
the question of the extent to which the allocation of legitimacy should
take into account the original intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights.6
The book's treatment of constitutional rights provisions is
selective. The essays provide no direct discussion of the Third or
Seventh Amendments and consider the Tenth Amendment by infer-
ence only. Regarding the other Amendments, no attempt is made to
be inclusive; the editors' choice as to what provisions deserved atten-
tion generally seems to have been governed by whether they were
currently the subject of popular controversy. Thus, most traditional
First Amendment issues, such as freedom of speech, press, petition,
and assembly, are largely ignored in favor of more current questions
involving symbolic expression, including whether the burning of the
American flag should be constitutionally protected. Similarly, the
Eighth Amendment's guarantees against excessive bail and fines
undoubtedly have had a more significant impact on large numbers of
Americans than the proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Because of its significance for the capital punishment debate,
however, only the latter clause receives attention. In addition, while
the essays primarily focus on the Bill of Rights, the book contains one
chapter on equal protection and affirmative action.
This review explores the book's valuable contribution to an
understanding of American constitutional liberty in four main sec-
tions. The first section examines four thematic essays that offer dif-
ferent interpretive frameworks for studying the changes in the mean-
ing of rights throughout American history. The second section con-
trasts these thematic interpretations with one that emphasizes con-
clusions presented in recent historical scholarship regarding the
character of change during the nation's first century. The third sec-
6. For a discussion of the concept of legitimation, see James Wllard Hurst, Law and
Markets in United States History: Different Modes of Bargaining Among Interests 97-98 (U. of
Wis., 1982). For a working-out of this concept in a particular historical period, see Tony A.
Freyer, Producers Versus Capitalist& Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum America (U. Press of
Va., 1994).
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tion places within this thematic context the essays that explore First
Amendment issues. The fourth section extends this examination to
the essays that primarily focus on the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments, and certain affirmative action controversies.
I.
The process by which government action legitimates rights
claims begins but does not end with constitutional texts. Daniel T.
Rodgers, Gary L. McDowell, Randy E. Barnett, and Kermit L. Hall
each provide different perspectives concerning the extent to which
popular and judicial officials have used particular constitutional provi-
sions to legitimate the scope and limits of rights claims. Hall's histori-
cal examination of judicial enforcement of state bills of rights within
the federal system and Rodgers's wide-ranging reconstruction of a
"rights consciousness" that transcends specific constitutional guaran-
tees throughout American history each suggest the extent to which
judicial and popular authorities always have interpreted rights-estab-
lishing texts in response to public discourse. Barnett's skillful recon-
struction of James Madison's views toward and early uses of the Ninth
Amendment reveals its significant, albeit latent, potential for rights
expansion. In each case, context and contingency shaped the struggle
for legitimacy more than a strict regard for the plain words of the text
itself. McDowell argues, however, that the proper meaning of rights
can be found in the intent underlying the governmental structure
created by the Constitution.7
In McDowell's view, rights claims are claims against individu-
als, groups, and communitarian authority. Each writer notes that
during the 1789-90 session, the First Congress rejected Madison's
attempt to apply the Bill of Rights to both the federal government and
the states. McDowell argues that this defeat was consistent with the
intent of the Constitution's framers and ratifiers. Constitutional texts
were expressions of Lockean contract theory in which community
consent caused rights claims to clash with private persons and gov-
ernment authority. The original document of 1787 created a structure
7. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 3-17 (cited in note 1); Gary L.
McDowell, The Explosion and Erosion of Rights, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 18-35; Kermit L. Hall,
Of Floors and Ceilings: The New Federalism and State Bills of Rights, in Bodenhamer and Ely at
191-206; Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today's Constitution, in Bodenhamer and Ely
at 177-90.
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in which enumerated powers and rights defined the relationship
between the state and federal governments. This structure made all
other rights claims dependent on expressions of popular consent
within the states. The Bill of Rights further strengthened this struc-
ture. Thus, at both the state and federal level, the intent underlying
the original constitutional texts fixed the boundary between commu-
nity authority and individual rights. Following the logic of Chief
Justice John Marshall's decision in Barron v. Baltimore,8 which held
that the Bill of Rights restrained only the federal government,
McDowell concludes that the "original will and consent of the people"
are superior to laws enacted by legislatures and the opinions of
courts. 9
Rights have meaning, moreover, only with reference to the
community's will as established by the specific and textual language
of original consent. According to McDowell, the conception of rights
anchored in this original consent did not endure. He concedes that
virtually from the beginning, state and federal courts sporadically
filled constitutional texts with meanings drawn from extra-textual
sources, including natural law. Such "philosophic flutters," however,
never dominated either the Marshall Court or, by implication, wider
jurisprudential discourse. Not until Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's
Dred Scott v. Sanfordo decision invalidated the Missouri Compromise,
which had asserted congressional authority to control slavery in the
territories, did the "first fissure" in the original order appear.1 Taney
contended that Congress lacked the power to enact the Compromise
because it violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of
law.1 2 Denying the slaveholders' right to take their property into
territories thus was contrary to the Due Process Clause. Although the
logical and historical basis of Taney's opinion was problematic,
McDowell finds its larger significance in the establishment of the
"revolutionary" principle that the Court could create rights-in this
case, those of slave holders-that the constitutional text did not
enumerate specifically.13
8. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
9. McDowell, The Explosion and Erosion of Rights, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 27 (cited in
note 1).
10. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
11. McDowell, The Explosion and Erosion of Rights, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 27 (cited in
note 1).
12. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
13. McDowell, The Explosion and Erosion of Rights, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 27 (cited in
note 1).
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According to McDowell, the Dred Scott opinion spawned many
problems. The Court not only undercut the ability of the legislature to
deal with the slavery issue; more importantly, it made rights contin-
gent on judicial construction rather than the text established by origi-
nal community consent. For McDowell, the Court's assertion of this
power to create rights beyond those specifically prescribed in the
constitutional text was a profound evil. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments-especially the Fourteenth-strengthened
the Court's claim of authority. By the 1890s, the Court began using
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to apply the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to limit state economic
regulations. 14  During the 1930s, the Court reversed its policy of
economic due process, favoring instead the incorporation of selected
provisions of the Bill of Rights to protect civil liberties. The Court
established the doctrine of selective incorporation in Palko v.
Connecticut.1 It strengthened its preference for civil over economic
liberty in footnote four of the 1938 United States v. Carolene Products
Co. decision.'6 These holdings paved the way for the Warren Court's
significant expansion of rights identified with the 1965 Griswold v.
Connecticut formulation of the right of privacy. 7
McDowell concludes that the theory of incorporation is wrong
for two basic reasons. First, it altered the balance between individual
rights claims and community control established by the consent given
the original constitutional text. Under this balance, community con-
sent not only defined the limits of government power generally, but
also made communitarian values enforced through state power of
primary importance. Accordingly, in most cases, community would
prevail over individual or group interests. The incorporation theory
was also wrong because it made the existence of rights contingent
upon vacillating judicial interpretation rather than being fixed forever
in an expressly written constitutional text. Thus, according to
McDowell, the decline of community control in favor of judicial power
eroded rather than strengthened rights claims.
In his excellent study of the Ninth Amendment, Barnett pre-
sents a contrasting textualist interpretation. Relying in part upon "a
recently discovered draft of a bill of rights written by Representative
14. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Property Rights in Modern
Constitutional Thought, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 89, 92 (cited in note 1).
15. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
16. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Roger Sherman,"18 Barnett argues persuasively that Madison and
other framers of the Bill of Rights intended the Ninth Amendment to
reserve to the people an "open-ended" conception of natural rights
"independent of those they are granted by a government and by which
the justice of governmental action is to be judged." 9 Barnett quotes
James Wilson's observation that "[iln all societies there are many
powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated."2 0 The
Ninth Amendment therefore represented a formal textual sanction of
the principle that rights existed outside the text. Initially, the enu-
merated provisions of the Bill of Rights restricted the federal govern-
ment, but the inalienability of the unenumerated natural rights also
protected the people from state action. Finally, Barnett concludes
that this textual grant of extra-textual rights guarantees the people a
"presumption of liberty" that limits not only the legislature and the
executive, but the judiciary as well.2'
Rights claims exist not only against persons and government
but also within the community. Rodgers and Hall concede that the
dominant opinion in the first Congress favored applying the Bill of
Rights to the federal government alone, yet the defeat of Madison's
attempt to extend the Bill of Rights to the states did not place rights
claims solely at odds with communitarian authority. Rodgers ob-
serves:
From the Virginia Bill of Rights through the New Deal's declaration of eco-
nomic rights and beyond, strong rights claims have gathered individual and
collective rights into a common fold. Some rights in the American polity are
held by persons, others by groups, by the "community" (as the Pennsylvania
Bill of Rights of 1776 had it), or the "people" as a whole.... The rights of
contemporary Americans include rights of possession and privacy; but they
also include the right to assemble, organize, worship, vote, and strike--all
collective rights, capable of being held only by communities of persons. 22
This multidimensional quality, embracing individual and col-
lective claims, constitutes a "rights consciousness" running throughout
American history. The Antifederalists' Bill of Rights campaign not
18. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today's Constitution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 180
(cited in note 1).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 181 (quoting from Merrell Jensen, ed., 2 The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution 388 (State Historical Society of Wis., 1976) (quoting in turn a
statement of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention on Nov. 28, 1787)).
21. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today's Constitution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 183-
89.
22. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 16 (cited in note 1).
19941 763
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
only wanted to protect individual rights from federal interference, but
also sought to preserve the communitarian impulse initially underly-
ing state bills of rights. Madison changed from opposing to supporting
a bill of rights in part because he said it would establish a basis for
appealing to the "sense of the community."23 From the beginning, Hall
shows, the states' record of enforcing these rights was mixed at best.24
Nevertheless, appeals to a community's "sense" within the states by
groups advocating collective as well as individual empowerment often
led to the initial success of rights claims. After the Antifederalists'
victory, the rights claims of white males lacking property or religious
qualifications for voting, abolitionists, suffragettes and other women's
groups, organized labor, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the Civil Rights Movement, environ-
mentalists, consumer groups, and many others were legitimated be-
cause state or federal elected officials, reflecting some degree of major-
ity sentiment, acted on their behalf.25
"Rights consciousness contains its own peculiar collective
dynamic," Rodgers concludes.26 "Translating pain and injury-a po-
liceman's beating, a 'no Jews wanted' sign, or a compulsory religious
oath-into claims of rights not only transfers personal wounds into the
realm of justice, but it simultaneously translates private experience
into a public category, a general claim, and potentially universalizing
language ."27 Despite the unmitigated oppression individuals and
groups suffered at the hands of majorities within states and federal
authorities, Rodgers believes that rights consciousness "remains a
powerful, unpredictable lever of change" within American democracy. 28
"Since the Revolution, rights consciousness ... has never been fully
separable from inquiry into rights as they ought to be, or might be, or
must once have been. The result has been a widely diffused, often
destabilizing inventive popular debate about fundamental rights and
the fundamentals of a just society."29
This interdependency between community and individual
claims to rights composed part of a new constitutional structure. As
Forrest McDonald has shown, the framers of the Constitution (and, by
23. Id. at8.
24. Hall, Of Floors and Ceilings, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 191-206 (cited in note 1).
25. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 3-17 (cited in note 1).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 16.
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implication, the Bill of Rights) possessed such a rich and diverse
ideological and practical experience that the "ingredients were incom-
patible.."30 The constitutional structure they created thus not only was
a bundle of compromises, but also something truly new. According to
Alexis de Tocqueville, by melding together the traditions of local or
state and national sovereignty, the Constitution created an institu-
tional anomaly requiring "not only that the federal government should
dictate the laws but that it should itself see to their execution."31 As a
practical matter, however, the nature of this federal power "rested
almost entirely on legal fictions."32 Through "good sense and practical
intelligence," the Americans, by the 1830s, had managed to "avoid the
innumerable difficulties deriving from their federal Constitution.""
Even so, "clearly here we have not a federal government but an in-
complete national government. Hence, a form of government has been
found which is neither precisely national nor federal; but things have
halted there, and the new word to express this new thing does not yet
exist."34
Tocqueville's observation suggests that the interplay between
constitutional structure and rights consciousness left neither static.
Throughout the nation's history, the meaning of both constitutional
provisions and rights evolved as a result of public discourse and con-
flict. During the formative period, it was "meaningless to say that the
framers intended this or that the framers intended that: their posi-
tions were diverse and, in many particulars, incompatible."35 Forrest
McDonald observes:
Some had firm, well rounded plans, some had strong convictions on only a few
points, some had self-contradictory ideas, some were guided only by vague
ideals. Some of their differences were subject to compromise; others were
not.8
Thus, from the beginning, constitutional texts could encompass multi-
ple meanings, depending on the context.3 7
30. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 8 (cited in note 4).
31. Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself, The Constitution in American
Culture 55 (Knopf, 1987) (quoting Tocqueville).
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 55.
35. McDonald, Novs Ordo Seclorum at 224 (cited in note 4).
36. Id.
37. Kammen, The Constitution in American Culture at 67 (cited in note 31).
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The dynamic quality of textual interpretation included cultural
and institutional dimensions. In Michael Kammen's view, Americans:
acquired the capacity to view their Constitution with a vision that was occa-
sionally clouded and frequently bifocal: bifocal in the sense that the
Constitution as a cultural symbol, rationalized in various ways, could be seen
on a separate plan-or literally through a discrete lens--from the
Constitution as a "practical system:"38
This bifocal vision manifested itself at both the state and national
levels of government in the platforms of political parties, found ex-
pression in the decisions of the Supreme Court, and engendered ongo-
ing popular and professional commentaries. Even so, the vision's
symbolic content interacted with the routine operation of formal
government institutions and their intermittent struggle to sustain a
societal discourse with a significant normative force.
This recognition of the importance of discourse distinguishes
McDowell's interpretation from that of Rodgers, Hall, and Barnett.
McDowell is confident about the meaning of constitutional texts be-
cause he is certain about the framers' intent: they intended to defend
individual rights by limiting the national government while subordi-
nating the same rights to the communitarian will within the states.
Rodgers's emphasis upon discourse places the formulation and subse-
quent interpretation of textual rights guarantees within a context of
flux, in which meaning depends on debate, conflict, and accommoda-
tion. In such a discourse, rights possess a communitarian as well as
an individualist dimension. The community may legitimate as well as
deny rights. Hall shows that the rich diversity institutionalized by
federalism also sanctions each dimension of the struggle for legitima-
tion. Barnett's recovery of the presumption of liberty grounded upon
natural rights and guaranteed by the open-ended provisions of the
Ninth Amendment may be reconciled with the interpretations of
Rodgers and Hall. In either case, contingency rather than certainty
shapes the outcome.
II.
In keeping with Bodenhamer and Ely's worthy goal of promot-
ing dialogue, it is useful to consider more closely the early growth of
38. Id.
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rights consciousness. To a greater or lesser extent, McDowell's,
Rodgers's, Hall's, and Barnett's thematic interpretations rest upon
assumptions regarding the formative era of constitutional
development from Independence to the end of Reconstruction. During
that period, conflicts involving rights shaped the origins of and initial
struggles over the meaning of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
struggles that culminated in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. This section offers further evidence to sug-
gest that, from the very beginning, discourse regarding the legitima-
tion of rights claims relied extensively upon extra-textual sources and
context.
According to Forrest McDonald, the Constitution was not a
Lockean compact. Locke's compact was "between the people on one
side, and the prince, sovereign or rulers, on the other."3 9 The new
Constitution was, however, a "compact among political societies"
constituting neither a single republic nor thirteen, but "a nation com-
posed of several thousand insular communities, each exercising virtu-
ally absolute powers over its members through two traditional institu-
tions, the militias and the juries."40 Thus, the interaction among po-
litical societies on the continental level and the multiplicity of local
communitarian authorities established the scope and limits of rights
claims within a new constitutional structure.41
In addition, the constitutional structure's newness suggested
that the present, more than the past, would shape its meaning. From
the beginning, persons such as Madison who had participated in the
Philadelphia Convention denied that the intent of the Constitution's
framers should influence policymaking. "As a guide in expounding
and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and inci-
dental decisions of the convention can have no authoritative charac-
ter," Madison wrote in 1821.42 The "legitimate meaning of the
Instrument must be derived from the text itself."41 In comparison,
Madison gave greater weight to the opinions expressed in the ratifying
conventions but still viewed them more as a guide than an absolute
authority.44
39. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 280 (cited in note 4).
40. Id. at 289.
41. Id. at 280,289.
42. Kammen, The Constitution in American Culture at 87-88 (cited in note 31) (quoting
James Madison, Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821)).
43. Kammen, The Constitution in American Culture at 87-88.
44. Id. at 88.
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Moreover, Madison wanted the Constitution's meaning to be
"well settled by practice." 45 Thus, the flux of evolving contemporary
circumstances rather than any reference to the framers' original in-
tent molded the content of the text. For over thirty years after 1787,
Madison's hope was fulfilled because the participants in the
Philadelphia convention made an oath to keep their deliberations
private.4 During that period, the true meaning of original intent was
disputed. Influential cultural traditions rooted in the Enlightenment
and British Protestantism adhered to such rigorous textual rational-
ism and literalism that any purported interpretation was suspect. A
competing tradition drew upon the legalistic devices found in the
common law. Not until the 1830s did supporters of either nationalism
or states' rights defend their constitutional theories by reference to the
framers' intent. These antagonists established the tradition that the
"true" meaning of original intent was in the eye of the beholder.47
Because self-interest governed a group's interpretation of
constitutional texts, judicial construction increasingly seemed appro-
priate. Locke himself recognized the special importance of an
independent judicial agent.4 People formed civil society primarily
because "in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law."4s In the same vein, Locke wrote, the disruption of
legislative authority justified the right of revolution partially because
it "thereby takes away the umpirage which everyone had consented to
for a peaceful decision of all their controversies."w0 Similarly, the
states' rights Nullifiers claimed that the states possessed ultimate
authority to interpret the Constitution. Madison, however, rejected
this reliance upon the states, favoring instead leaving final authorita-
tive construction to the Supreme Court. He conceded that the poten-
tial for abuse of judicial review existed; however, he opined, the
"abuse of a trust does not disprove its existence."5'
45. Id. at 87.
46. Id. at 88.
47. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 885 (1985).
48. See John Locke, Second Treatise... On Civil Government, reprinted in 1 The People
Shall Judge: Readings in the Formation of American Policy 68 (U. of Chicago, 1949).
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id. at 112.
51. Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy 70
(Cambridge U., 1989) (quoting Madison).
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The federal judiciary worked to reduce these tensions, but its
efforts only indirectly impacted the states. "Federal judges almost
always alone decide those questions," Tocqueville observed, "that
touch the government of the country most closely."52 Yet, he wrote,
the states rather than the federal government exercised "real power"
during the antebellum years.3 Still, Americans accepted that "it was
almost impossible that the execution of a new law should not injure
some private interest."54 The Constitution's "makers" relied on that
"private interest to attack the legislative measure of which the Union
might have complained," and it was that interest to which the federal
courts "offer[ed] protection."55 Thus, although "federal justice" and
"state sovereignty" were "at odds," the federal courts "attack[ed] only
indirectly... strik[ing] at the consequences of the law, not at its prin-
ciple; it does not abolish but enervates it."5 The courts "intervene[d],"
Tocqueville concluded, "in public affairs only by chance, but that
chance recurs daily."57 The overriding constitutional command that
federal judges protect individuals-particularly residents of different
states--therefore compelled repeated consideration and interpretation
of the limits and meaning of state and federal law and the
Constitution itself.
Led by the Supreme Court, the federal judiciary successfully
fended off the critics. From the 1790s on, Congress repeatedly at-
tempted to curtail the federal judiciary's jurisdiction, particularly by
abolishing section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which enabled the
Supreme Court to review the decisions of each state's highest tribunal.
Because Congress possesses almost complete control over federal
jurisdiction, the scope of the Supreme Court's authority is potentially
vulnerable to these political pressures. Except for the Eleventh
Amendment, however, no such effort had succeeded before the Civil
War. The Marshall Court deflected the threat by giving code words
such as "commerce," "contract," and "union" purportedly neutral
meanings that deflected the critics' assertions regarding
"consolidation" and "discretion."5 The Taney Court followed the same
52. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 276 n.7 (Doubleday, J.P. Mayer, ed. 1975).
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id. at 148.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 149.
57. Id. at 99.
58. See G. Edward White, 3-4 History of the Supreme Court of the United States The
Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 8-9 (MacMillan, 1988); Carl B. Swisher, 5
History of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Taney Period, 1836-1864 71-204, 320-38,
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strategy, adjusting its predecessor's precedents to changing political
and market conditions. Moreover, the Taney Court actually extended
federal judicial power in the fields of admiralty and commercial
credit.59 Meanwhile, the Jacksonian-dominated Court obscured its
accommodation of the Marshall Court's jurisprudence by using states'
rights code phrases. The general proposition that both the Marshall
and Taney Courts established concerning the text embodying these
code words was that the Court merely found and declared law; it did
not make law.60
The Court prevailed by making a three-pronged response to the
critics' attacks. First, the Court employed a linguistic analysis of the
constitutional or legal text embodying such terms as "contract" or
"commerce," extracting from the words a purportedly neutral principle
that in turn would be used to pack the word with an extra-textual
meaning.8 1 The principle drawn from the Commerce Clause in
Gibbons; for example, was intercourse, resulting in an interpretation
of the commerce power that extended beyond trade alone to include
the regulation of steamboats.62 The Taney Court employed this tech-
nique in Commerce Clause cases to define the boundary of state regu-
lation of commercial activity (including slavery) as long as Congress
remained silent.63 Similarly, the Marshall Court extended the Con-
tract Clause to include not only private contracts between individuals
but also state-chartered corporations. 64 Beginning with the Charles
River Bridge decision, the Taney Court further altered the Contract
Clause by enlarging the states' regulatory authority.65 A second ap-
proach adapted this technique to nonconstitutional doctrines of the
common law, recasting their content to apply to new situations. The
Taney Court's. creation of the general commercial law in Swift v.
Tyson provides the most notable example.66 Finally, both the
357-527, 592-690 (MacMillan, 1974). Note that Swisher does not expressly employ the "code
word" methodology, but a reading of the Taney Court decisions in light of White's methodology
suggests the same result.
59. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How.
443 (1851).
60. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change at 195-200 (cited in note 58); Freyer,
Producers Versus Capitalists at 28, 52 (cited in note 6).
61. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change at 8-9.
62. Id. at 568-84.
63. Swisher, The Taney Period at 357-422,528-58.
64. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change at 595-673.
65. Swisher, The Taney Period at 71-154.
66. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change at 485-594; Swisher, The Taney Period
at 320-38.
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Marshall and Taney Courts shielded their deliberations from signifi-
cant public scrutiny through institutionalized secrecy.6
The Court's three-pronged response to this challenge adapted
the Constitution and the common law to change while denying that a
court made law. Thus, the Court presented its alteration of constitu-
tional language or common-law doctrine as the clarification or reasser-
tion of settled principles. It explicitly denied that it was creating
anything new. This technique succeeded primarily because it em-
ployed the constitutional ideal to permit a reconciliation of the past
and the future. The threat of republican decay, evidenced by the
relation of the past to the future, was central to the ideological ten-
sions associated with American exceptionalism as well as to escape
from the historical cycle of growth and decay. In addition, the Court's
particular recasting of "commerce," "contract," "consolidation,"
"discretion," and other code words of constitutional and legal texts
facilitated the adjustment of republican ideology to the rising influ-
ence of liberalism and the free-labor ideology. Finally, at least until
the Dred Scott decision, the response deflected certain charges of
critics regarding partisanship and "consolidation" by sustaining the
Court's and the federal judiciary's neutrality in defense of federalism
and independence from corruption and tyranny.68
The Court's purported dependence upon fundamental princi-
ples to establish an extra-textual meaning had an ambivalent influ-
ence on rights consciousness. The Marshall Court rejected arguments
that would have extended rights to slaves and Native Americans by
employing natural law precepts to interpret constitutional texts.69
Prior to Barron v. Baltimore, Justice William Johnson, in at least two
opinions, nonetheless concluded or intimated that the Seventh
Amendment and provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights applied to the states.7 0  Similarly, William Rawle, U.S.
Attorney for Philadelphia and author of a noted constitutional trea-
tise, wrote that the "[First Amendment] expressly refers to the powers
of congress alone, but some of those which follow are to be more gen-
67. The analysis is taken from White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change at 9, and
applied to Swisher, The Taney Period. The case cites referred to in this paragraph are: Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420 (1837); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
68. See notes 58 and 60 and accompanying text. See also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857).
69. White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change at 674-770 (cited in note 58).
70. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1 (1820). But see Johnson's opinion in Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833).
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erally construed, and considered as applying to the state legislatures
as well as that of the Union.""' In 1823, Justice Bushrod
Washington's circuit decision in Corfield v. Coryel172 construed the
Constitution's Comity Clause, Article IV, Section 2, to hold that there
were certain rights,
in their nature fundamental[,] which belong of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several states which compose this Union from the time of their becoming free,
independent, and sovereign .73
Abolitionists urged an alternative view of rights that was none-
theless consistent with the prevailing extra-textualist interpretive
technique. A number of abolitionists employed constitutional inter-
pretations that rejected or simply ignored the logic and holding of
Barron v. Baltimore and the first Congress's decision not to apply the
Bill of Rights to the states. In part, most of these efforts adopted the
reasoning of Rawle and Justice Johnson, arguing that because only
the First Amendment specifically referred to Congress, the general
language of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments must have included both the federal and state govern-
ments.7 4 A number of abolitionist writers buttressed this view with
reference to Justice Washington's holding in Corfield that Article IV
guaranteed all American citizens certain fundamental rights.75 These
interpretations shared with the dominant jurisprudence evidenced by
the Supreme Court's decisions the presumption that constitutional
and legal provisions rested upon principles that could be construed to
have an extra-textual content. The abolitionists found their basic
principles in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution's
Preamble.76 While the dominant legal culture did not consider these
particular sources controlling, the linguistic analysis of the constitu-
tional and legal texts was ultimately the same in both cases. 77
71. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States 124 (Da Capo, reprint,
1970).
72. 6 F. Cases 546, No. 3230 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
73. Id. at 551-52.
74. See notes 70 and 71 and accompanying text; Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833).
75. See the discussion of Theodore D. Weld, Charles Olcott, H.L. Pinchney, Elizur Wright,
Alvin Stewart, William Goodell, George W.F. Mellen, and others in William M. Wiecek, The
Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 (Cornell U., 1977).
76. William Goodell, Views of American Constitutional Law in Its Bearing Upon American
Slavery 91-96 (Lawson & Chaplin, 2d ed., 1845; reprint, Books for Libraries Press, 1971).
77. Id. See also notes 61 and 68 and accompanying text.
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Prior to the Civil War, the abolitionists' principles shaped the
emergence of the personal liberty laws. In response to the growing
controversy over federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave laws, and
drawing upon principles articulated by Justices Johnson and
Washington, a growing number of northern states passed laws guar-
anteeing basic rights of due process for all persons, regardless of race.
During the 1840s and 1850s, the South's resistance to these laws led
to increasing confrontations in which northern abolitionists and anti-
slavery defenders, ironically, supported states' rights to aid individual
freedom, including that of traveling or escaped slaves. The South,
however, argued for vigorous enforcement of national power. In two
leading cases, Prigg v. Pennsylvania7s and Ableman v. Booth,79 the
Supreme Court decided against the states' rights principles underlying
the personal liberty laws. Nevertheless, the laws became a central
plank in the Republican Party's antislavery campaign, ultimately
influencing the Fourteenth Amendment.8° The personal liberty laws
thus represented a significant example of state-based majorities creat-
ing rights.
These diverse influences constituted a public discourse that
shaped the emergence of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. The abolitionists' repudiation of Dred Scott culminated
in the amendment abolishing slavery.81 Recent scholarship further
confirms that the abolitionists' rejection of the doctrines underlying
Barron v. Baltimore informed the debate over the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the issue of whether the framers intended to
apply all or part of the Bill of Rights to the states. This recent schol-
arship wholly supports neither Charles Fairman's denial of any intent
to incorporate nor Justice Hugo Black's assertion that the framers
favored total incorporation.82 Instead, Earl Maltz, Robert J.
Kaczorowski, William Nelson, and others conclude that the ideological
clash between the abolitionists and their opponents created the con-
78. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
79. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
80. Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional
Development, 1835-1875 107-10, 152, 155, 193, 208, 214-21 (Harper & Row, 1982); Thomas D.
Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North 1780-1861 (Johns Hopkins U.,
1974).
81. U.S. Const., Amend. XI[[.
82. See note 83. See also Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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text for conflicting theories, at the center of which stood the Bill of
Rights.8
The Republicans' views concerning the incorporation issue
spread along a continuum. At one end of the continuum were certain
Republicans who conceded that, at a minimum, the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed that principles of equality before the law
inherent in the Bill of Rights now applied to the states.84 At the other
end of the continuum were certain of the Amendment's framers, such
as Congressman John A. Bingham and Senator Jacob M. Howard,
who stated categorically that the Amendment incorporated portions of
the Bill of Rights. 5 Ultimately, a complete reading of all the evidence
establishes a strong presumption that, at the very least, the framers
intended the Bill of Rights to have some bearing on the interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, an initial decision by a lower
federal court employed a theory of selective incorporation. The
Supreme Court rejected this theory in the Slaughter-House Cases, at
least insofar as the theory governed the interpretation of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. s6 Nevertheless, the Court's interpreta-
tion of basic rights hearkened back to Justice Washington's reasoning
in Corfield v. Coryell.7 Justice Johnson and the abolitionists sug-
gested in their rejection of the theory propounded in Barron v.
Baltimore that the principles underlying Corfield and the Bill of
Rights were the same.s
The incorporation controversy created important implications
for textual interpretation. McDonald has shown that the founding
generation's political experience and ideological heritage embodied
"incompatible ingredients." 9 As a result, in response to a multiplicity
of communitarian interests that transcend the values of the Lockean
83. Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863.1869 (Kansas U.,
1990); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial
Doctrine (Harvard U., 1988); Robert J. Kaczorowsld, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986); Howard Jay Graham,
Everyman's Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, The "Conspiracy
Theory," and American Constitutionalism (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968); Michael
Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge (Duke U., 1986); Horace Edward Flack, The Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment (P. Smith, 1965).
84. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 110-47.
85. Id. at 117-18.
86. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
87. 6 F. Cases 546, No. 3230 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
88. Id. See also notes 70 and 75 and accompanying text. For a lower court decision, see
United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cases 79 No. 15,282 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). But see United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), and Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
89. See note 30 and accompanying text.
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contract, the framers created a constitutional structure that was truly
new, making resort to extra-textual meaning inevitable in any claim
of constitutional legitimation. Madison and Tocqueville affirmed this
in their recognition of the leading role the federal judiciary served in
establishing legitimacy through interpretation of constitutional provi-
sions.90 As it grew into this role, the Supreme Court relied upon extra-
textual analysis. The Court's success in resisting its critics suggested,
however, the degree to which the wider political and cultural context
shaped the principles underlying decisionmaking. This interplay
between the larger social context-including the abolitionist move-
ment-and the Court established the parameters of public discourse
that resulted in passage of the personal liberty laws and ultimately
shaped the campaign for constitutional revision, especially the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the interminable incorporation debate
reflected the triumph of contextualist interpretations of constitutional
texts.
During the twentieth century, contextualist pressures domi-
nated the search for legitimacy in struggles involving the First
Amendment. Under the theory of selective incorporation established
in Palko v. Connecticut9' and the strict scrutiny principle of United
States v. Carolene Products,92 the Court approached First Amendment
rights with a presumption of validity.9 3  According to McDowell's
interpretation, this preference was inconsistent with a strict regard
for the constitutional text, especially given the original intent of the
First Amendment's framers.94 This section suggests an alternative
view consistent with Rodgers's "rights consciousness" and Hall's
discussion of federalism, especially as they relate to communitarian
interests.
90. See notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
91. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
92. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
93. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323-26; Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. For the citations to the
McDowell, Rodgers, and Hall articles, see note 7.
94. Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press at xv (Oxford U., 1985).
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A.
Constitutionally protected freedom of expression had a multi-
dimensional meaning that evolved over time. Paul Murphy's insight-
ful study of symbolic speech notes that while the Boston Tea Party
was a form of symbolic expression, such behavior did not raise First
Amendment issues until the early twentieth century.9 5 As a matter of
constitutional law, Murphy is, of course, correct. Still, the status of
seditious libel during the late eighteenth century possessed a commu-
nity dimension with more modern parallels. Leonard Levy has argued
persuasively that the First Amendment and the legal sanctions en-
forceable for criminal libel were not inconsistent at the time the Bill of
Rights became part of the Constitution.9 6 During the same period,
however, the press actually functioned "as if the law of criminal libel
hardly mattered."97 Periodically editors were imprisoned, but the risk
of going to jail apparently did little or nothing to dampen the press's
aggressiveness. Thus, according to Levy, even though the press's
regular criticism of public officials often was contrary to black letter
law, the practical impact of this constraint on what the press pub-
lished was negligible.9 8
Rather than examining the inconsistency between rule and
practice, one should focus on what libel law legitimated. Three points
seem relevant. First, a large segment of the community constituted a
market for the consumption of vigorous printed criticism of govern-
ment officials, a market that thrived whether or not the government
prosecuted editors. Second, given the extensive public opinion favor-
ing "unfettered press practices,"99 the government's resources were too
limited to initiate anything more than selective enforcement. Third,
the practical effect of selective enforcement, at least in the case of the
Federalist prosecution of Democratic-Republican editors prior to
Jefferson's election in 1800, was to encourage Democratic-Republicans
to mobilize political opposition that resulted in the Federalists' de-
feat. 100 At about the same time, through constitutional amendments
and legislation, some states also enlarged free-press protection by
making truth a defense. Thus, formally and symbolically, the political
95. Paul L. Murphy, Symbolic Speech and the irst Amendment, in Bodenhamer and Ely at
39-56 (cited in note 1).
96. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press at xv (cited in note 94).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. atxvii.
100. Id. at 280-81, 296-308.
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struggle over the implementation of a restrictive libel rule legitimated
practices contrary to that rule. Put another way, the market context
reflected a community interest in limiting the reach of the formal legal
rule. As a result, weak enforcement actually legitimated a wide public
space within which publishers freely satisfied customers' demands
regardless of the law's specific command. 1° 1
Murphy's historical treatment suggests that controversies
involving symbolic speech fit a similar pattern. During and after the
First World War, federal and state governments used symbolic ap-
peals to patriotism to justify rigorous enforcement of seditious libel
laws for the suppression of various forms of antiwar demonstrations,
from distributing peace leaflets to picketing. Gradually, however, the
Supreme Court widened the meaning of expression protected by the
First Amendment to include such public protests. The Court broad-
ened its view in response to libertarian theories put forth by the
American Civil Liberties Union and others representing organized
labor, radicals, and humanitarian activists. Drawing upon the ideas
of Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee, the ACLU emphasized
that such protests benefitted not only individual freedom but also
democracy itself.10 2 As the Court wrestled with recurring demands to
enlarge the official space in which to conduct what Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. called the "free trade in ideas," it legitimated new
forms of expression that protest groups used to convince others that
their cause was just.1°3
Thus, both a communitarian and an individualist dynamic to
rights claims defined as symbolic expression existed. The early cases
Murphy discusses involved not only the Young Communist League but
also Jehovah's Witnesses. 104 He also might have added early litigation
in which the Court considered the constitutional status of picketing.1°5
In each instance, the Court rejected or distinguished earlier prece-
dents to hold that the display of a red flag, a child's religion-motivated
refusal to salute the American flag, and picketing were forms of ex-
pression protected by the First Amendment.06 Murphy notes correctly
101. Id.
102. Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror:. Law in American History 262-63 (Oxford U., 1989).
103. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 42 (cited in note 1) (quoting
Justice Holmes).
104. Id. at 41-42.
105. Hall, The Magic Mirror at 244-45 (cited in note 102); Tony Freyer, Hugo L. Black and
the Dilemma of American Liberalism 85 (Scott, Foresman, 1990).
106. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
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that while these decisions did not involve specifically the idea of
symbolic expression, the Court recognized that flags and picketing
possessed a symbolic content contributing to the "political discussion
of a free society."107 The Court's increased legitimation of such expres-
sion evidenced growing cultural tolerance of religious, ethnic, racial,
and social-class minorities that ultimately prevailed in America as a
result of the struggle against totalitarian regimes during World War
II.
To be sure, the government and private groups relentlessly
persecuted Communists and other radicals. Nevertheless, what de-
serves emphasis in this connection is that many minority groups that
historically had been attacked and denied a significant voice became
part of the liberal coalition that formed a majority between the 1930s
and 1960s.'0 Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's assertion in footnote four
of the Carolene Products decision, that the Court's protection of
"insular minorities"- would benefit democracy, was consistent with his
lone dissent in the first flag salute case defending the Jehovah's
Witness's right of conscience."°* Through forms of expression including
symbolic action, an enlarged public space for the assertion of commu-
nitarian as well as individual rights claims achieved legitimation.
As Murphy shows, the evolution of "speech plus" doctrinal
standards reflected similar tensions. Judges made a distinction
between "pure speech"--verbal expression, for example, in a traditional
speech or a newspaper editorial-and speech combined with conduct such as
marches, pickets, and sit-ins. More concretely, the conduct, which was the
"plus," was often symbolic conduct-flag desecration, draft card burning,
pouring human blood upon the files of a local draft board.110
Employing doctrines based on this distinction, the Court generally
sanctioned conduct involving civil rights protests on behalf of racial
justice.',, The Court's response to protests against the Vietnam War
was more varied. The First Amendment did not protect the de-
struction of draft cards and registration certificates,11 2 but the Court
considered wearing black armbands in public schools or wearing a
107. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 42 (cited in note 1).
108. See Freyer, Hugo L. Black at 49-166 (cited in note 105).
109. Compare United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), with
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
110. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 43 (cited in note 1).
111. Id. at 44; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
112. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 44, 48, 52; United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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jacket inside the Los Angeles Courthouse upon which appeared the
words "Fuck the Draft" protected conduct."3 Nevertheless, in 1984
the Court denied such protection to a group protesting the plight of
the homeless by sleeping in Washington, D.C. national park sites.'14
The Court further refined the distinction in other cases, generally
legitimating an enlarged ground on which groups and individuals
could assert "speech plus" rights claims.115
These strands of judicial policymaking shaped other, more
controversial issues of symbolic expression. For example, local com-
munities enacted ordinances to protect groups from threatening forms
of conduct. In 1978, a federal district court declared unconstitutional
one such ordinance forbidding the display of neo-Nazi symbols and
regalia by a group marching through Skokie, Illinois, a Chicago sub-
urb in which many Jews lived, including survivors of the Holocaust.116
Similarly, the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul, Minnesota or-
dinance prohibiting forms of expression based on racial or ethnic
hatred or bias.117 Under this ordinance, local officials prosecuted indi-
viduals who burned a cross in the yard of an African-American fam-
ily's home.11 8 The Court also confronted federal and state laws against
the burning of the American flag as an act of political protest. The
most well-known case involved Gregory Johnson, a member of an anti-
nuclear war group that opposed the "policies of the Reagan
Administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations."1 9 As part of
the group's protest before television cameras during the 1984
Republican National Convention in Dallas, Johnson burned an
American flag.120 The incident sparked widespread popular support
for a constitutional amendment outlawing such action. Although the
amendment did not pass, Congress and various states enacted legisla-
tion criminalizing flag burning. By a five-to-four majority, however,
the Court struck down these laws.121
113. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 45-46; Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971).
114. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 47-48; Clark v. Community for
Creative Non.Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
115. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 44, 50-52; Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cowgill v. California, 420 U.S. 930 (1974); United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
116. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd, 478 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
117. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 39-40 (cited in note 1).
118. R.AV. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
119. Murphy, Symbolic Speech, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 52 (cited in note 1).
120. Id.
121. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Murphy skillfully demonstrates the continuity existing be-
tween these recent issues and earlier conflicts. Emphasizing continu-
ity is useful because it suggests how often struggles involving an indi-
vidual's symbolic expression have had implications for group action.
As a result, persecuted outsiders were able to join the dominant soci-
ety's democratic discourse. Of course, perpetrators of racially moti-
vated hate protests or flag burners, unlike organized labor and racial
minorities, or even the Federalists' newspaper-editor critics, will not
necessarily become part of the ruling political coalition. Nevertheless,
the direct or indirect legitimation of symbolic expression often had a
communitarian impact consistent with the "collective dynamid' and
"democratic character" Rodgers describes. 122
B.
Melvin I. Urofsky's subtle examination of the First
Amendment's two religion clauses further suggests the interdepen-
dency of communitarian and individual values. Urofsky begins with
Justice Hugo L. Black's majority decision in Everson v. Board of
Education,123 which constructed the basic constitutional framework
the Court has employed to interpret the Establishment and Free
Exercise of Religion Clauses.124 Since Everson, doctrinal elaboration
has shifted along a continuum. At one end stands the absolutist
position identified with Black, based on the unequivocal belief that a
high "wall of separation" existed between religion and governmental
authority.125 At the other end of the continuum rests an accommoda-
tionist position forbidding the state to prefer one religion or faith over
another, requiring instead equal treatment.126 Urofsky's discussion is
predominately Court-centered, yet he does note the same jurispruden-
tial concerns raised by McDowell and something of the late-eighteenth
century context. In conclusion, he endorses Professor Jesse Choper's
point that the Court's interpretation of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses is "logically irreconcilable."127
Urofsky correctly points out that this logical conflict is trace-
able to Black's Everson decision. The narrow issue in that case was
122. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 16 (cited in note 1).
123. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
124. Melvin I. Urofsky, Church and State: The Religion Clauses, in Bodenhamer and Ely at
57-71 (cited in note 1); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15, 18.
125. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
126. Urofsky, Church and State, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 64-71 (cited in note 1).
127. Id. at 69 (quoting Choper).
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whether a New Jersey law authorizing local school boards to reim-
burse parents for bus fares paid by their children to attend either
public or Catholic schools violated the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause. Black equated the expenditure of tax dollars to ensure
children's safe transport to both public and Catholic schools with the
use of such funds to support police protection for all children. Black
reviewed the history of the nation's experience with religious estab-
lishment, concluding that the First Amendment required the "state to
be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers."128 According to this "neutrality" principle, the community's
use of tax funds to aid the safe transportation of all children to school
did not represent the "slightest breach" of the "high and impregnable
wall" separating church and state. 12 9 Dissenters led by Justice Robert
Jackson argued that the "undertones of the opinion, advocating com-
plete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their com-
mingling in educational matters."13o
The conflict between the views advocated by Justices Black
and Jackson persisted in the Court's subsequent Establishment
Clause decisions. The Court's vacillation between absolutist and
accommodationist positions provided the basis for the Secondary
Education Act of 1965, which provided federal funding for public and
private schools.' 31 Not inconsistent with Black's neutrality principle,
the law aided needy students rather than schools. Thus, Urofsky
observes, "both congress and the states made determined efforts to
establish programs that benefitted parochial and private schools as
well as public systems."132 According to Jackson's reasoning, however,
it was not clear how aiding needy students was different from aiding
schools. In numerous cases including the explosive issue of school
prayer, defenders of the absolutist position challenged this ambiguity
of principle. After years of litigation, the Court established what
became known as the three-pronged Lemon test: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally the statute must not foster an excessive government
128. Evereon, 330 U.S. at 18.
129. Id. at 19.
130. Id. at 44-45.
131. Urofsky, Church and State, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 65 (cited in note 1).
132. Id.
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entanglement with religion."133 During the mid-1980s the Court
stretched the Lemon test to the limit in cases such as that which
upheld the display of a publicly funded Christmas nativity scene
before the city hall of Pawtucket, Rhode Island.134  Ultimately,
however, the Court adhered to the basic Lemon principles.13 5
Urofsky is particularly good at distinguishing the Free Exercise
Clause issues from the Establishment Clause issues. The Free
Exercise Clause, according to Urofsky, raises the question not only
whether the state may interfere with the individual's right, but also
whether it may be required to confer a benefit upon those exercising
that right.136 The fundamental question is whether it is possible to
interpret the Constitution with absolute neutrality. In an early
decision, Sherbert v. Verner,13 7 the Court held that South Carolina
could not deny unemployment compensation payments to a Seventh-
Day Adventist who lost her job for refusing to work on Saturday in
accordance with the teachings of her religion. Similarly, in Wisconsin
v. Yoder 38 the Court held that Wisconsin must exempt Old Order
Amish from the state's compulsory education law requiring all
adolescent children to attend high school. The Court deferred to those
members of the religion who believed that compliance with the law
threatened their children's spiritual salvation.13 9 In these cases, the
Court either permitted or required the state to provide exemptions,
which in effect benefitted certain religions.4
In 1990, the Court for the first time interpreted the Free Exer-
cise Clause to deny such implicit preferences. The Court held that in
accord with the state's need to control harmful drug use, it could
require a drug rehabilitation program to dismiss two employees who
had ingested peyote as part of the Native American Church's religious
ceremony.14' Unlike Sherbert and Yoder, which involved civil penal-
ties, the peyote case raised the issue of criminal sanctions." 2 Based on
this distinction, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority,
133. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
134. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
135. Urofsky, Church and State, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 65, 69 (cited in note 1).
136. Id. at 69.
137. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
138. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
139. Id. at 235.36; Urofsky, Church and State, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 69 (cited in note 1).
140. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20; Urofsky, Church and State, in
Bodenhamer and Ely at 69.
141. Urofsky, Church and State, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 70 (discussing Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
142. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-85.
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held that "never" had the Court decided "that an individual's religious
beliefs excused him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."' 14  Congress
nonetheless found Scalia's opinion to be sufficiently problematic that,
in 1993, with broad Democratic and Republican Party support, it
passed legislation based on the pre-1990 precedents.14 Upon signing
the law, President Bill Clinton observed that those precedents held
the government "to a very high level of proof before it interferes with
someone's free exercise of religion."145 More formally, the test required
that restrictive laws serve a compelling government interest in a
manner that imposes the lightest possible burden on religious free-
dom.14
This legislative legitimation of precedents permitting an im-
plicit religious preference nonetheless logically contradicts the Estab-
lishment Clause precedents. Urofsky follows Choper on this point,
emphasizing that
[o]n the one hand, the Court has read the establishment clause as saying that
if a law's purpose is to aid religion, it is unconstitutional. On the other hand,
the Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that, under certain cir-
cumstances, the state must aid religion.147
Urofsky observes correctly that the problem arises because of the first
prong of the Lemon test, which declares laws unconstitutional if they
have a religious purpose. 48 Issues that require the Court to distin-
guish the two lines of decisions, however, inevitably will arise.
Urofsky observes:
Religion, like race, is a tangled skein, and not amenable to simplistic solu-
tions. The Court has recognized this, and from the absolutist decisions of the
early Warren era, the Court has moved steadily toward a jurisprudence of
balancing various considerations. It is this balancing that marked the Court's
approach to church-state issues since the early 1970s. 149
The First Amendment provides a good test of McDowell's the-
matic interpretation. The clauses beginning with the command
143. Id. at 878-79.
144. Clinton Signs Bill Written to Ensure Religious Freedom, Tuscaloosa News 5A (Nov. 17,
1993).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Urofsky, Church and State, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 69 (cited in note 1).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 63.
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"Congress shall make no law" comprise a text that hardly could seem
plainer. Moreover, the rich scholarship of Levy and others provides a
solid foundation for arriving at the framers' intent.150 Levy's extensive
evidence also shows, however, that the actions of newspaper editors
directly contradicted the "origina' meaning and intent of the
Amendment, even in the face of Federalist prosecution.1 51 Indeed,
their actions suggested a view more consistent with the absolutist
theories of Hugo Black, because the editors operated as if neither state
nor federal laws controlled their rights of expression. In any case, in
terms of policy outcome, the First Amendment's ineffectual enforce-
ment ultimately legitimated rights claims that conflicted with the
framers' original intent. In that sense, the context of the conflict
reflected a public discourse that prevailed over the strict meaning of
the intent of the text's framers. The same may be said of the
Amendment's two religion clauses.
Both Murphy and Urofsky further suggest how often an indi-
vidual's First Amendment claim legitimated communitarian values.
In many instances, the expression and religious clause cases involved
members of groups seeking to establish or already possessing influ-
ence within the democratic process, for example, individuals associ-
ated with organized labor or large ethno-religious groups such as the
Jewish community. Certainly, neither the Jehovah's Witnesses and
Amish families that brought Establishment and Free Exercise Clause
suits nor little-known political groups such as that which included
flag-burner Gregory Johnson were formally members of larger minor-
ity groups. The issues these smaller and less-known groups raised,
however, touched the interests of more influential segments of gener-
ally liberal constituencies that gained influence from the 1930s on.
After the 1970s these liberal constituencies no longer constituted a
majority within the American polity. Taken together, however, all of
those groups reflected a communitarian democratic discourse not
unlike that of the "insular communities" that McDonald argues
shaped the Constitution of 1787.152
150. See Levy, Emergence of a Free Press at xvi (cited in note 94), and sources cited therein.
151. Id.
152. See note 40.
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IV.
A communitarian context infused rights claims seeking legiti-
mation based on the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, as well as affirmative action. The rights of the accused
presented perhaps the most familiar of these struggles. David J.
Bodenhamer's fine historical treatment explores the rise and dissolu-
tion of the due process revolution identified with the Warren Court's
activism. The U.S. Justice Department's efforts during the Reagan
and Bush Administrations to overturn "a judicially created system of
restrictions of law enforcement that has emerged since the 1960s" is
Bodenhamer's initial reference point.'5 In a well-crafted essay, he
traces the history of the Court's incremental and selective application
of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.M
Bodenhamer argues convincingly that the conservative rever-
sal of the due process revolution breaks with the past. In the section
entitled "Prelude to Revolution," he shows that throughout at least
the first half of the nation's history, the "white majority" shared a
"notion of fairness" encapsulated in the "fifteenth-century English
maxim" that "it was better for twenty guilty persons to escape pun-
ishment than one person to suffer wrongly."155 The public's belief in
this maxim coexisted with steady change in state-based administra-
tion of justice. Organized police forces first appeared during the first
half of the nineteenth century and gradually were professionalized
throughout the following century. Judicial enforcement also changed;
not only did bench trials rival jury trials, but courts and prosecutors
increasingly relied upon plea bargaining, especially in the nation's
growing urban centers. Accordingly, Bodenhamer elaborates upon
Hall's point that the federal system, in which the states dominated
criminal justice administration, spawned such diversity and discre-
tionary enforcement that the public's faith in fairness seemed threat-
ened by "adhocracy," lack of uniformity, and potential for abuse. 1m
Changes in the social and institutional environment generally
preceded the Warren Court's due process revolution. Bodenhamer
reconstructs this environment well, taking into account how, during
153. David J. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution Rights of the Accused in a
Conservative Age, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 101 (cited in note 1).
154. Id. at 101-19.
155. Id. at 103.
156. Id. at 104-05.
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the first half of the twentieth century, the growing tensions within the
state-based criminal justice system paralleled both the decline in local
law enforcement autonomy because of interstate highways and chain
stores and the rising national concern about authorities' abusive
treatment of racial and ethnic minorities.157 In addition, these con-
flicts coincided with steadily growing popular resistance to corrupt law
enforcement, resistance identified perhaps most expressly with lax
local enforcement of Prohibition. 15 As early as the 1920s, government
investigations, such as the Wickersham Commission and Felix
Frankfurter's Criminal Justice in Cleveland, documented that such
corruption was endemic to the local administration of justice through-
out the first half of the twentieth century.15 9
As these problems converged, state officials sought remedies
consistent with the public's faith in fairness. Prior to the Warren
Court's decisions applying the exclusionary rule to the states, for
example, half of the states already had adopted it.16o Similarly, before
the Court decided that in state as well as federal litigation the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel included indigents, twenty-three states
urged the Court to adopt that rule.61 State authorities criticized the
Court's earlier denial of indigents' rights for causing "confusion and
contradiction." 162 The more uniform rights incorporation made possi-
ble, by contrast, served "as a beacon to guide trial judges."163 Roger B.
Traynor, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, agreed.
Explaining why he changed from opposing to supporting the exclu-
sionary rule, Traynor said, "My misgivings... grew as I observed...
a steady course of illegal police procedures that deliberately and
flagrantly violated the Constitution.... [I]t had become all too obvi-
ous that the unconstitutional police methods of obtaining evidence
were not being deterred. ..." 164 In conclusion, Bodenhamer argues
that the Rehnquist Court's steady reversal of the due process revolu-
tion repudiated the values that Traynor and many other state and
157. Id. at 105.
158. Hall, Magic Mirror at 250.51,254-55 (cited in note 102).
159. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 104 (cited in note 1);
Hall, Magic Mirror at 254 (cited in note 102).
160. Laurence A. Benner and Michal R. Bellmap, Police Practices and the Bill of Rights, in
Bodenhamer and Ely at 131.
161. Bodenhanier, Reversing the Revolution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 107.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Benner and Belknap, Police Practices, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 131 (cited in note 1).
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local authorities had come to support and that the Warren Court had
legitimated. 65
Laurence A. Benner and Michal R. Belknap's insightful explo-
ration of police practices and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
makes a similar point. The essay skillfully blends historical and con-
temporary context to show that the evolution of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments represented a tension between two model criminal
justice systems. A "crime control" model presumes that the chief
function of the criminal justice system is the arrest and punishment of
malefactors.16 Defenders of this model favor subordinating individual
liberty and privacy to the means and ends of rigorous law enforce-
ment.8 7 The model legitimates short-term considerations demanding
an immediate reaction to the war on crime. By contrast, the "due
process" model gives primary importance to the protection of "rights to
liberty, privacy and self-determination... [that are] essential to the
continued existence of a free and democratic society."168 Embracing a
"long-term view," the due process model legitimates the policy proposi-
tion that control of crime is secondary to the threat "that the social
order will disintegrate if abuse and discrimination are not kept in
check by fair procedures."' 189
Like Bodenhamer, Benner and Belknap use rich detail to illus-
trate that neither model has dominated with consistency. American
citizens' abiding commitment to fairness has managed to maintain
simultaneously the inherent tension between crime control and due
process. The tension was apparent from the beginning when Congress
drafted the Fourth Amendment in reaction to British officials' abuse of
warrants, including the writs of assistance. But for a "quirk of his-
tory," whereby Congressman Egbert Benson altered the final draft so
that instead of probable cause being "universally required for any
search or seizure, regardless of the circumstances," the "tampered text
... seemed expressly to require probable cause only in cases involving
warrants."17° The Rehnquist Court has exploited this ambiguity to
erode the Court's earlier strong adherence to probable cause in deter-
mining whether a search or seizure was "reasonable."17, Much the
165. Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 114-19.
166. Benner and Belknap, Police Practices, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 137-38.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 137.
169. Id. at 137-38.
170. Id. at 125-26.
171. U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Griffin v. Wiscon8in, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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same is true of the history and current state of Fifth Amendment law.
In both cases, present doctrine is "riddled with exceptions" because of
the Court's corresponding restriction of the exclusionary rule.172
Neither Bodenhamer nor Benner and Belknap consider, how-
ever, the important consequences of change for popular conceptions of
fairness. Doctrinal ambiguity legitimated the broadened discretionary
authority of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, prose-
cutors, and courts; it also encouraged defense counsel to rely on nego-
tiational strategies. In many ways this broad authority represented a
return to an earlier accommodation of crime control and due process
values that once was prevalent in America and can still be found in
many of the nation's rural areas. Under the ever-growing burden of
urban crime, public officials and the defense counsel opposition, like
their small-town counterparts, engage in varying degrees of "comity."
For example, "judges ... avoid challenging the prosecution because
they need the prosecutor's cooperation in order to dispose of cases."' -,
A willingness to conform to such pressures "creates a system that is at
times unfair to women, minorities, low-income individuals, and the
uneducated."174 These responses are consistent with the public's cur-
rent fear of crime that informs Bodenhamer's and Benner and
Belknap's discussions.
Despite widespread criticism, the Warren Court's due process
revolution also possessed and legitimated a communitarian dimen-
sion. The evidence presented by Bodenhamer, Benner, and Belknap is
consistent with the findings of other legal historians that the Court's
formulation of uniform standards converged with and sustained com-
munity support for state and local efforts to upgrade law enforcement
training and practices. 75 Particularly during the decades immediately
following World War II, the public supported such efforts in part
because of a feeling of common interest among middle-class people
traveling the new interstate highways; these people felt vulnerable to
the corrupt practices of local authorities. 176 They also shared a broad-
172. Benner and Belkmap, Police Practices, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 132-33 (cited in note
1).
173. Elizabeth Levitan Spaid, Rural Courts Get Special Attention: Justice Center Helps
Country Tribunals Deal with the Challenges Small Systems Face, 83 Christian Science Monitor
12 (Oct. 1, 1991). Compare Lawrence M. Friedman and Robert V. Percival, The Roots of Justice:
Crime and Punishment in Alameda County, California, 1870-1910 (U. of North Carolina, 1981).
174. Spaid, Rural Courts, 83 Christian Science Monitor at 12.
175. See Hall, Magic Mirror at 253-57, 300-03 (cited in note 102); Friedman and Percival,
Crime and Punishment at 197, 323-25 (cited in note 173).
176. Hall, Magic Mirror at 253-57, 300-03 (cited in note 102).
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based concern about the humanitarian abuses and racial discrimina-
tion associated with fascist and communist totalitarianism. The
NAACP appealed to this common interest and anti-totalitarian senti-
ment in its civil rights struggle, which included attacks upon local
southern law enforcement officials' brutal treatment of African-
Americans. 177 Similarly, when called upon to enforce the public's am-
biguous expectations regarding fairness, Chief Justice Warren's and
Justice Black's support of the due process revolution was consistent
with their own experiences as local and state prosecutors. 17
Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond shed new light on
the relation between public safety and the right to bear arms. The
current debate over whether the collective rights theory should govern
the interpretation of the Second Amendment is historically selective.
The collective rights theory contends that the framers only wanted to
guarantee the states' right to maintain a militia against federal domi-
nation. 179  Consistent with the colonists' struggle against British
authority and an even longer tradition of resistance to standing ar-
mies, however, the Second Amendment's framers also sought to secure
Americans "a right to individual self-defense."'18 Even so, as the
authors reveal, the meaning of this right was complex. From the time
of its constitutional enshrinement to the present, the factors involving
individual self-defense affected the white majority and ethnic and
racial minorities differently. Prior to the nation's recent history, laws
recognized few limitations on the white majority's exercise of the
right.18 1 Meanwhile, laws imposed restrictions on the right of Indians,
slaves, African-Americans, and ethnic immigrants to bear arms and to
defend themselves. 8 2 At the same time, public officials declined to
protect those same minority groups from, and often threatened them
with, violence.18
Communitarian conflicts circumscribed the exercise of the right
to bear arms. Initially, the local community's role in the maintenance
of public defense through the militia coincided with popular attach-
177. Id. at 253-55, 260-62, 300-03. For a discussion of the influence of the new interstate
highways, see Bodenhamer, Reversing the Revolution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 104 (cited in
note 1); Benner and Belknap, Police Practices, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 138.
178. Freyer, Hugo L. Black at 141, 151 (cited in note 105); Bodenhamer, Reversing the
Revolution, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 106 (cited in note 1).
179. Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to Bear Arms,
in Bodenhamer and Ely at 72.
180. Id. at 73.
181. Id. at 73-75.
182. Id. at 75.
183. Id. at 75, 77-81.
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ment to the individual's right of self-defense. Historically, outright
prohibitions and other restrictions excluded minorities from full
participation in either community-sanctioned function.8 4 The militia
role ceased in the nineteenth century and formal limitations on mi-
norities' right of self-defense ended in the twentieth century. The
Rodney King and Reginald Denny incidents suggested that "a society
with a dismal record of protecting a people has a dubious claim on the
right to disarm them," Cottrol and Diamond conclude elsewhere. 1 5
"Perhaps a re-examination of this history can lead us to a modern
realization of what the framers of the Second Amendment understood:
that it is unwise to place the means of protection totally in the hands
of the state, and that self-defense is also a civil right."1' 6 Informed by
ineffectual or discriminatory law enforcement within poor black and
minority neighborhoods, this conclusion is motivated by the demand
for legitimation of communitarian empowerment as much as it is by
the attachment to individual liberty.
Joseph L. Hoffmann also places controversies involving the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Clause within a communitarian
context. In one of the book's more philosophically sophisticated
essays, Hoffmann explores how the Court doctrinally linked the
Eighth Amendment and the death penalty. He argues persuasively
that throughout American history the core meaning of "cruel and
unusual punishment" reflected the prevailing moral sense of the
community.1 87  The nation's rich cultural diversity, reinforced by
federalism, ensured that this moral sense was neither static through
time nor uniform from place to place. Many Americans agreed that
blatant brutality by rogue authorities constituted "cruel and unusual
punishment." Consensus dissolved into contentiousness, however,
when legislatures, prosecutors, juries, and trial or appellate judges
confronted the complex moral and procedural issues posed by
sentencing.1' s
Fundamentally, the controversy over whether the death pen-
alty constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" intermingles sen-
tencing issues with popular moral presumptions. Hoffmann's treat-
ment of the doctrinal questions relating to the Eighth Amendment as
184. Id.
185. Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an Afro.
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Georgetown L. J. 309, 361 (1991).
186. Id.
187. Joseph L. Hoffman, The "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Clause: A Limit on the Power
to Punish or Constitutional Rhetoric?, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 139 (cited in note 1).
188. Id. at 139-54.
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a guarantee of proportional punishments, a source of procedural
rights, or a prohibition of certain punishments is incisive. The inabil-
ity of Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall to win
majority support for the principle that the Eighth Amendment made
the "death penalty unconstitutional per se" shaped the future inter-
pretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.8 9 As a
result, "the Court may be unable to resist, at least for long, the
inevitable pressure to adopt the majoritarian point of view."19°
Hoffmann's finely textured discussion nonetheless suggests that,
historically at least, flux and diversity rather than certainty and
uniformity have characterized this majoritarian point of view. If so, it
seems reasonable to expect that the clause will continue to be central
to the community's struggle over the legitimation of capital
punishment.
James W. Ely, Jr. suggests the communitarian implications of
rights consciousness for property rights. Emphasizing the Supreme
Court's decisions involving the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clauses, the Article I, Section 10 Contract Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the Takings
Clause of the Fifth .Amendment, Ely establishes an analytical dichot-
omy between possessive-individualist values favoring property claims
and the theory formulated in the Court's Carolene Products decision,
which subordinated such claims to the government's regulatory
authority.'1 The theory also subjected laws affecting civil liberties
and civil rights to a standard of stricter scrutiny. A policy distinction
that permits this greater regulatory control of economic rights is
"dubious," Ely contends, because "many" such government policies
benefitted "special interest groups" rather than the public interest,
including consumers. 192  He implies further that this preference is
inconsistent with the values of Madison and the founding genera-
tion.19 3
Ely's analysis obscures the broader communitarian context of
property rights conflicts. His basic analytical presumption that
"special interests" and the "public interest" are readily distinguishable
pays insufficient attention to the theoretical and policy issues involved
189. Id. at 145-46.
190. Id. at 154.
191. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
192. James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Property Rights in Modern Constitutional
Thought, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 90 (cited in note 1).
193. Id. at 87-100.
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in such a dichotomy. For example, a voluminous amount of scholarly
literature addresses the problem of whether nineteenth-century rail-
road laws, or the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, properly may be
categorized as interest group legislation.194 In each case, the struggle
pitted local segments of consumer, producer, and business constituen-
cies against other segments of similar, or even the same, constituen-
cies working through the state and federal legislative and judicial
process. 19 5 Similarly, the clash between groups of debtors and groups
of creditors--both influential segments of the polity in the states--
shaped Madison's view of property rights protection. 19 6 The underly-
ing theoretical problem involves establishing a line where the public
interest ends and special interests begin. Fundamentally, the conflict
involves individual groups seeking to establish or maintain legitimacy
as political and legal constituencies within the wider community.
Accordingly, many, if not most, significant economic interests repre-
sent, to a greater or lesser degree, interest groups that may be termed
communitarian.
Herman Belz's treatment of affirmative action policy toward
employment discrimination raises similar issues. Belz begins with an
informative examination of the contrasts between the origins of af-
firmative action policy and the 1964 Civil Rights Act's Title VII, which
prohibited racial and gender discrimination in employment prac-
tices.197 Belz interprets the initial purpose of both affirmative action
policy and Title VII "within the framework of the intentional disparate
treatment theory of discrimination . . . [which] held that dis-
crimination must stem from an intentional act that resulted in injury
or denial of equal opportunity."'19 Belz employs this theory to construe
the Act's prohibition of remedies requiring quotas. He then argues
194. For the diversity of those groups who, among other reforms, sought regulation, see John
D. Bunker, The Progessive Era: A Search for a Synthesis, 51 Mid-America 175-93 (July 1969).
Two classic treatments of business sources of regulation are Robert H. Weibe, Businessmen and
Reform (Harvard U., 1962), and Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton
U., 1965). Important revisions of the revisionists are Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ideas and Interests:
Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 J. Am. Hist. 561-78 (Dec. 1967), and Albro
Martin, The Troubled Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age-A Reappraisal, 61 J. Am.
Hist. 339-71 (Sept. 1974). See also Tony A. Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great
Britain and America, 1880-1990 (Cambridge U., 1992).
195. See sources cited in note 194. See also text and sources cited in Herbert Hovenkamp,
Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 105-68 (especially pages 106-09, 167-68) (Harvard U.,
1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Protected Classes, 88 Mich. L. Rev., 1 (1989).
196. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers at 66-67 (cited in note 51).
197. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988).
198. Herman Belz, Equal Protection and Affirmative Action, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 157
(cited in note 1).
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that Republican and Democratic administrations and Supreme Court
decisions, including Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,199 Bakke v. Regents of
the University of California,200 and Weber v. United Steelworkers of
America,20' subverted this original purpose by reinterpreting affirma-
tive action and Title VII according to a disparate impact theory that
mandated equality of result and indirectly permitted quota reme-
dies.202 Belz contrasts this evolution of policy and judicial doctrine
with the Reagan-Bush administration's campaign to return to the
intent-based theory, particularly the prohibition against quotas. He
then argues that because of political opportunism, moderate
Republicans, liberal Democrats, and the civil rights lobby in Congress
defeated this campaign in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which permit-
ted race-conscious policies.2 03
Belz's history raises questions, however, involving communi-
tarian conflicts. It is not clear that a majority of the members of
Congress enacting Title VII, or the subsequent Republican and
Democratic presidential administrations fashioning affirmative action
policy, were acting out of strict obedience to disparate impact treat-
ment or any other theory. Instead, the political considerations associ-
ated with contending minority, business, labor, white southern ra-
cially segregated, and northern white non-segregated communities
shaped lawmaking. Each community interest struggled not so much
for an abstract theory as for formal legitimation of their influence
within the governmental process. Once sanctioned through formal
action in the form of executive order, legislative enactment, or court
decision, these community interests engaged in ongoing debate over
the meaning of the law in action. Evolution of the law's meaning was
inevitable as the position of community interests changed. The record
of conflict that eventually culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
thus involved a struggle too wide to be contained within the bounda-
ries of the two contending theories alone. Indeed, mere political
opportunism may be insufficient to explain the broad range of groups
eventually supporting the law's passage. Perhaps, far from being
contrary to popular notions of equality, affirmative action represents
199. 401 U.S. 238 (1971).
200. 438 U.S. 407 (1978).
201. 443 U.S. 197 (1979).
202. Belz, Equal Protection and Affirmative Action, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 158-65 (cited
in note 1).
203, Id. at 155-76.
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American democracy's continuing attempt to adapt the egalitarian
ideal to changing times.2 4
The essays exploring the rights of the accused, the Second and
Eighth Amendments, property rights, and affirmative action suggest
the degree to which rights exist within a community. The claims of
individuals against police or trial courts have force in part because
they appeal to a community's norms of fairness. A convergence of
interests between those in the majority, concerning the exclusionary
rule, and indigents' right to counsel established a basis for community
action within the states that resulted in reforms legitimating fairer,
more uniform principles. The vacillation regarding death penalty
sentencing reflects similar tensions. The clamor involving the right to
bear arms, particularly considered from the point of view of minority
community interests, also reflects the voices of contending groups as
much as a conflict between individual rights claims and governmental
authority. Struggles involving economic rights, including property
rights and affirmative action, possess an important communitarian
dimension as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The essays Ely and Bodenhamer have collected make a useful
contribution to the current rights debate. Since the 1970s, the
Supreme Court and presidential administrations increasingly have
challenged the rights revolution sparked during the 1930s. The con-
tributors to this book disagree as to whether a retreat from that revo-
lution is good or bad. This review suggests yet another way of under-
standing these issues. Considered in light of changing historical
context, the communitarian dimension to legitimation struggles en-
larged as well as diminished rights claims. Thus, individuals and
weaker groups often established common ground with stronger com-
munity interests. Even so, the public discourse arising from the
search for common ground ultimately was no less significant than the
restriction of rights that the essays in this book so fully explore.
204. Tony A. Freyer, Book Review, Herman Belz, Equality Transforme& A Quarter-Century
of Affirmative Action, 78 J. Am. Hist. 1524, 1524-25 (Mar. 1992). Compare Belz, Equal Protection
and Affirmative Action, in Bodenhamer and Ely at 167-170 (cited in note 1).
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